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The author evaluates the fiscal stimulus policies of 20 OECD countries within a
simple benefit-cost framework. Among his findings: in Canada, to be justifiable
on a benefit-cost basis, a fiscal stimulus project that improves consumptive
public services must provide at least 73 cents in benefits for every dollar of
fiscal stimulus.
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TAX COMPETITIVENESS PROGRAMThe large fiscal stimulus measures recently adopted by most member countries of
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have
been justified on the basis of the income and employment generated through the
“Keynesian multiplier effect” of such measures. This paper addresses two questions:
￿ Can fiscal stimulus measures be justified on a benefit-cost basis? 
￿ What accounts for the large variation in the fiscal stimulus measures OECD
countries have adopted?
This Backgrounder evaluates the discretionary fiscal policies of 20 OECD countries
within a simple benefit-cost framework. Using estimates of these countries’ fiscal
multipliers and the marginal cost of funds they borrow to undertake public-sector
spending, it is possible to calculate the minimum marginal benefit that a fiscal
stimulus project must provide to be justified on a benefit-cost basis. That benefit
varies widely among these OECD countries and differs between projects that
provide direct consumption benefits, such as renovating a hockey arena, and
productivity-enhancing projects, such as investing in transportation infrastructure.
In Canada, to be justifiable on a benefit-cost basis, a fiscal stimulus project that
improves consumptive public services must provide at least 73 cents in benefits for
every dollar of fiscal stimulus. For a productivity-enhancing infrastructure project,
the present value of the increase in labour productivity must be at least 61 cents for
each dollar spent on infrastructure.
Projects that would not satisfy benefit-cost criteria in “normal times” might be
justified during a major recession as part of a fiscal stimulus package, but fiscal
stimulus cannot justify “useless projects” such as Keynes’s famous example of
burying money in bottles in abandoned mines. 
Differences in the 20 OECD countries’ economic and fiscal circumstances – the size
of the shock to their economy, the size of their economy’s automatic stabilizers, the
magnitude of their fiscal multiplier, the level of taxation, and the marginal cost of
funds from public-sector borrowing – explain much of the variation in the
magnitudes of the fiscal stimulus measures they have adopted.
ABOUTTHE INSTITUTE
The C.D. Howe Institute is a leading independent, economic and social policy research institution.
The Institute promotes sound policies in these fields for all Canadians through its research and
communications. Its nationwide activities include regular policy roundtables and presentations by
policy staff in major regional centres, as well as before parliamentary committees. The Institute’s
individual and corporate members are drawn from business, universities and the professions across
the country.
INDEPENDENT • REASONED ￿ RELEVANT
THE AUTHOR OF
THIS ISSUE





Rigorous external review 
of every major policy study,
undertaken by academics
and outside experts, helps
ensure the quality, integrity




ISSN 0824-8001 (print); 
ISSN 1703-0765 (online)
THE STUDY IN BRIEFBackgrounder 121    | 1
Independent • Reasoned • Relevant    C.D. Howe Institute
  I would like to thank Colin Busby, Paul De Grauwe, Ergete Ferede, David Laidler, Stuart Landon, Alex Laurin, Bill Robson, Michael Smart, 
and members of the Tax Competitiveness Council for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. However, they are not responsible for 
any of its shortcomings.  
I
n response to severe economic 
shocks in 2008, many 
governments have tried to 
stabilize their economies by 
increasing spending or cutting taxes. 
Two questions immediately present 
themselves:
•    Can ﬁscal stimulus measures be justiﬁed on a 
beneﬁt-cost basis? 
•    What explains the large variation in the ﬁscal 
stimuli that major industrialized countries 
have adopted?
There is considerable debate about whether 
the short-term beneﬁts of these ﬁscal stimulus 
programs are large enough to justify the long-term 
costs arising from the subsequent increase in the 
public debt, but there has been little formal analysis 
of this issue. The objective of this Backgrounder 
is to evaluate the discretionary ﬁscal policies 
of 20 member countries of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) within a simple beneﬁt-cost framework. 
I begin by computing the minimum direct 
marginal beneﬁt (MDMB) of a consumption-
oriented public project and the minimum marginal 
productivity (MMP) – the minimum net present 
value of the increase in labour income from 
spending an additional dollar – of a productivity-
enhancing infrastructure project that is needed 
to justify discretionary ﬁscal policies on a beneﬁt-
cost basis. The results indicate that the minimum 
marginal beneﬁts required to justify ﬁscal stimulus 
measures vary widely across OECD countries.
I then investigate some of the factors that are 
responsible for the different levels of ﬁscal stimu-
lus OECD countries have adopted. The model 
predicts that the level of ﬁscal stimulus a country 
adopts should  increase with the size of its adverse 
shock, increase with the product of its overall tax 
rate and its marginal cost of funds from public-
sector borrowing, and decrease as the magnitude  
of its automatic stabilizers grows. Despite the 
small size of the sample, this model ﬁts the data 
reasonably well. I hope that the analysis presented 
here can offer the public and policymakers some 
guidance concerning the desirability of adopting 
ﬁscal stimulus measures in the future.
Beneﬁt-Cost Analysis of Fiscal 
Stimulus Measures
Fiscal stimulus has emerged as a pre-eminent 
economic policy issue as countries cut taxes 
and increased spending to combat the worst 
global recession since the 1930s. The intellectual 
foundation for the use of discretionary ﬁscal 
policy was laid by John Maynard Keynes in 
his justly famous work, The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money, published in 
1936. After World War II, Keynes’s framework 
was modiﬁed and extended by a generation of 
economists, and many governments adopted 
Keynesian ﬁscal policy to combat involuntary 
unemployment and stabilize their economies. In 
the 1970s, however, reliance on Keynesian ﬁscal 
policies fell out of favour in light of the emergence 
of the phenomenon known as “stagﬂation” 
(i.e. when the economy has both high rates of 
inﬂation and unemployment), and skepticism 
about the ability of governments to use ﬁscal 
policy for short-term stabilization of the economy. 
At the same time, there was renewed interest 
in neoclassical models of the economy, which 
supplanted the simple Keynesian macroeconomic 
models. Monetary policy replaced ﬁscal policy as 
the main stabilization tool, and attention turned 
to long-run growth models. The key elements 
of the Keynesian framework – the size of the 
ﬁscal multiplier and the strength of an economy’s 
automatic stabilizers – were no longer on the 
research agendas of most macroeconomists.
In the past year, however, in the light of the 
macroeconomic shocks sustained by countries 
around the world, economists have dusted off 
the Keynesian models and concepts in the search | 2  Backgrounder 121
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for guidance to offer governments as they adopt 
ﬁscal stimulus packages. Yet, despite the wide-
spread adoption of such packages, there is a lively 
debate among economists concerning the efﬁcacy 
of current ﬁscal stimulus programs; Box 1 offers 
a ﬂavour of the debate by presenting the views 
of some prominent economists on discretionary 
ﬁscal policy.1 
On the pro-stimulus side of the debate, there is 
Keynes’s famous statement that, when there are 
many involuntarily unemployed workers, any 
spending project, including burying jars full of 
money in abandoned mines, would result in a net 
social gain. In other words, government spending 
on “useless” projects could be justiﬁed because of 
the stimulus it provides private-sector employment 
1  See also the exchange between Lee Ohanian (2009) and Robert Frank (2009) on the merits of ﬁscal stimulus, and the views of Phelps (2009) 
on the inadequacies of both the Keynesian and neoclassical models.
“If the Treasury were to ﬁll old bottles with 
banknotes, bury them at suitable depths in disused 
coalmines which are then ﬁlled up to the surface with 
town rubbish, and leave it to private enterprise on 
well-tried principles of laissez-faire to dig the notes up 
again…there need be no more unemployment and, 
with the help of the repercussions, the real income of 
the community, and its capital wealth also, would 
probably become a good deal greater than it actually 
is. It would, indeed, be more sensible to build houses 
and the like; but if there are political and practical 
difﬁculties in the way of this, the above would be 
better than nothing.”
John Maynard Keynes (1936, chap. 10).
“The components of a ﬁscal stimulus package are 
costs to the federal budget; but to the extent that they 
put otherwise unemployed labor and idle industrial 
capacity to work, they do not impoverish the economy; 
in fact, they enrich it. (Of course, one would prefer 
useful projects to wasteful ones.) If ﬁscal stimulus 
works, even imperfectly, there is no doubt which way 
the beneﬁt-cost ratio goes.”
Robert M. Solow (2009).
“My main point is that we should not use the 
cover of ﬁscal stimulus to undertake massive public 
works programs that do not pass muster from the 
perspective of cost-beneﬁt analysis.”
Robert J. Barro (2009, 3).
“There are drawbacks [to discretionary ﬁscal policy]: 
the subsequent deadweight loss of ﬁnancing all 
the extra government debt that has been incurred, 
and the fear that too rapid a run-up in debt may 
discourage private investors from building physical 
assets, which form the tax base for the future 
governments that will have to amortize the extra 
debt.”
Brad Delong (2009, 2).
“America’s projected deﬁcits may sound large, yet it 
would take only a modest tax increase to cover the 
expected rise in interest payments — and right now 
American taxes are well below those in most other 
wealthy countries.”
Paul Krugman (2009a).
“[T]he claim that we’ll have to pay for stimulus 
spending now with higher taxes later is mostly 
wrong. Spending more on recovery will lead to 
a stronger economy, both now and in the future 
— and a stronger economy means more government 
revenue. Stimulus spending probably doesn’t pay for 
itself, but its true cost, even in a narrow ﬁscal sense, 
is only a fraction of the headline number.”
Paul Krugman (2009b).
Box 1: Views of Prominent Economists on Discretionary Fiscal PolicyBackgrounder 121    | 3
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and output. This view, updated and slightly 
hedged, has recently been echoed by Nobel Prize-
winning economist Robert Solow (2009), who 
argues that, in the US context, the ﬁscal stimulus 
is justiﬁed on a beneﬁt-cost basis. Speaking 
for the other side of the debate is eminent US 
economist Robert Barro (2009), who is skeptical 
that the ﬁscal multipliers are large enough to 
justify “massive public works programs that do not 
pass muster from the perspective of cost-beneﬁt 
analysis.”2  
In addition to concerns about whether the 
multiplier effects are large enough to justify ﬁscal 
stimulus programs on a beneﬁt-cost basis, some 
economists, such as Brad Delong (2009), are 
wary of the long-run consequences of the increase 
in public-sector debt used to ﬁnance the ﬁscal 
stimulus packages; others, such Paul Krugman 
(2009a, 2009b), a Nobel laureate and high-proﬁle 
commentator on US public policy, feel that the 
ﬁnancing problem is “manageable” because current 
tax rates in the United States are low compared to 
those in other OECD countries and the stimulus 
measures generate additional tax revenues.
Concerns about the efﬁcacy of discretionary 
ﬁscal policy are not restricted to US economists. 
Almost all OECD countries and many develop-
ing countries, including China, have increased 
spending and reduced taxes as part of their ﬁscal 
stimulus packages. One would expect that the 
key parameters – the size of the ﬁscal multiplier, 
the magnitude of the automatic stabilizers, and 
the marginal cost of funds from public-sector 
borrowing – will vary across countries, making 
ﬁscal stimulus highly advantageous in some and 
less beneﬁcial, or even undesirable, in others. 
Consequently, it is worthwhile examining these 
issues for a group of OECD countries, using data 
developed by the OECD in its review of the ﬁscal 
stimulus measures adopted by member countries.
As Figure 1 indicates, there has been a wide 
range of ﬁscal responses to the crisis.3 Of the 20 
OECD countries in the survey, the United States 
has adopted the largest ﬁscal stimulus pack-
age in 2009 and 2010, equivalent to nearly 5.5 
percent of gross domestic product (GDP), while 
Switzerland’s package, at 0.5 percent, is the small-
2  See also Barro and Redlick (2009)  on the size of the ﬁscal multipliers in the United States.
3  Most of the data used in this Backgrounder are taken from OECD (2009) and from various issues of OECD Outlook published in 2009. 
See also Horton, Kumar, and Mauro (2009) for an analysis of the ﬁscal policy responses of the G20 countries.
Figure 1:   Discretionary Fiscal Stimulus as a Percentage of GDP , 20 OECD Countries, 
2009 and 2010 
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est.4 By way of comparison, Canada (federal and 
provincial governments combined) has the fourth-
largest stimulus package, at just over 4.0 percent 
of GDP, while the (unweighted) average ﬁscal 
stimulus is 2.6 percent of GDP. It is important to 
note that these ﬁgures refer to the discretionary 
ﬁscal stimulus that countries have adopted and 
do not include the effects of automatic stabilizers 
(such as increases in social assistance and unem-
ployment insurance payments) that have contrib-
uted to increases in governments’ deﬁcits.
The cost to the private sector when a govern-
ment borrows an extra dollar – which economists 
refer to as the marginal cost of funds (MCF) 
from public sector borrowing – generally exceeds 
a dollar because the increase in tax rates that is 
required to ﬁnance interest payments on the 
public debt creates disincentives to work, save, 
and invest that reduce output. Figure 2 shows 
that the MCF varies widely across the 20 OECD 
countries in the survey, with Denmark having 
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Figure 2: Marginal Cost of Funds (MCF), 20 OECD Countries
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Figure 3: Fiscal Multiplier
Source: Bank of Canada. 2006. “Renewal of Inﬂation Control Target – Background Information.” November. Page 4.
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Figure 3: Fiscal Multipliers, 20 OECD Countries
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at 1.10.5 In general, countries with high tax rates 
also have a high MCF because the additional 
distortion caused by a tax rate increase is greater 
the higher is the initial tax rate.6 Canada’s MCF 
is 1.30, which is close to the value for a personal 
income tax increase that Baylor and Beauséjour 
(2004) obtain using a different dynamic general 
equilibrium model. Kleven and Kreiner (2006), 
who calculate the MCF for Denmark, France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom under a 
variety of assumptions about the labour supply 
and participation decisions, obtain rankings for 
the four countries that are generally the same as 
those in Figure 2; they ﬁnd that Denmark’s MCF 
exceeds 3.00 when the labour force participation 
of low-income workers is highly responsive to 
their real after-tax wage rate.
There is a great deal of controversy over the size 
of the multiplier effects of government ﬁscal stim-
ulus programs.7 For example, the U.S. Council of 
Economic Advisors’ (United States 2009) reports 
multipliers for the United States that are as high 
as 1.57. Barro (2009), however, argues that the 
use of multipliers that exceed 1 is unrealistic. His 
recent research, reported in Barro and Redlick 
(2009), indicates that, in the United States, “the 
multiplier effect of defence spending falls more 
in the range of 0.6 to 0.8, and we ﬁnd it unlikely 
that non-defence multipliers would be larger.” 
Recent research by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and 
Rebelo (2009) and Cogan et al. (2009) also reach 
vastly different conclusions regarding the size of 
US ﬁscal multipliers. These differences seem to be 
based on different assumptions about how long 
US interest rates will remain low and how long 
the ﬁscal stimulus will be applied.
Rather than the wide range of multipliers that 
have been put forward in the literature, in my 
analysis I used those of the OECD, which has 
vast experience in forecasting the macroeconomic 
responses of its member countries; moreover, 
the OECD’s ﬁscal multipliers are available on a 
consistent basis for the group of countries in the 
sample. As Figure 3 shows, the multipliers range 
from 1.21 for Poland to 0.13 for the Netherlands, 
while the average for the 20 OECD countries is 
0.45. The OECD’s estimate of the multiplier in 
Canada is 0.50, a ﬁgure that is well below esti-
mates ranging from 0.8 to 1.5 for spending and 
from 0.1 to 0.9 for tax cuts published by the 
Department of Finance in the 2009 budget (see 
Canada 2009, table A1.1). Similarly, the OECD’s 
estimate of the multiplier for the United States, 
0.55, is considerably lower than that used by 
“Team Obama.” In my view, the OECD’s more 
conservative multipliers seem reasonable given 
that many households in Canada and the United 
States have increased their savings rates to offset 
the decline in their wealth caused by recent losses 
in the housing and stock markets.
Thus, using the OECD’s estimates of the ﬁscal 
multipliers and my computations of the MCF 
from public-sector borrowing, it is possible to 
calculate the minimum marginal beneﬁt of a 
ﬁscal stimulus project that would justify its use 
on a beneﬁt-cost basis. In doing so, I distinguish 
between projects (such as renovating a hockey 
rink) that provide direct consumption beneﬁts, for 
which I calculate the MDMB, and those (such as 
investment in transportation infrastructure) that 
enhance labour productivity, for which I calcu-
late the MMP. The MDMB and MMP represent 
thresholds that projects must satisfy to be justiﬁed 
on a beneﬁt-cost basis. These thresholds are higher 
when the MCF is higher or when the ﬁscal multi-
plier is lower. When both the MDMB and MMP 
are higher, fewer projects satisfy the beneﬁt-cost 
criterion, and a country should adopt a lower level 
5  Auerbach and Gale (2009) argue that the tax and expenditure policies in the United States are not sustainable, largely because of future 
increases in Medicare spending, and that a ﬁve-to-ten percentage point increase in taxes or cut in spending is required to close the ﬁscal gap. 
My computations assume that governments maintain a sustainable ﬁscal policy and, therefore, the US MCF might be substantially under-
estimated because its future tax rates could be substantially higher. Similar issues also might affect the computations of the MCF of other 
OECD countries, notably the United Kingdom, which also faces a long-term problem of ﬁscal sustainability — see Buiter (2009) and Wolf 
(2009) on that country’s ﬁscal situation.
6   The correlation coefﬁcient between the tax rate and the MCF for this group of countries is 0.69.
7  On the magnitude of multiplier effects, see Hemming et al. (2002a, 2002b); and Ilzetski, Mendoza, and Vegh (2009).| 6  Backgrounder 121
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of ﬁscal stimulus. (Appendix A explains how the 
MDMB and MMP are calculated.)
As Figure 4 shows, Denmark has the highest 
MDMB of the 20 OECD countries, at 2.22. This 
means that, in Denmark, a project providing a 
direct consumption beneﬁt would not be justi-
ﬁed as a ﬁscal stimulus measure unless an addi-
tional krone spent on the project yielded at least 
2.22 kroner in direct beneﬁts, a condition that 
presumably relatively few “off-the-shelf” projects 
would satisfy. The four countries with the high-
est MCF – Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands – are also those with the highest 
MDMB; they also have relatively low ﬁscal multi-
pliers, in part because of their high tax rates, but 
also because they are small, open economies with 
a relatively high marginal propensity to import. At 
the other extreme, Poland’s MDMB is negative. 
Taken literally, this means that the Polish govern-
ment could even hire workers to ﬁll community 
swimming pools with stones and demolish schools 
and such harmful projects could still be justi-
ﬁed because of their income-generating effects. 
Poland, in fact, is the only country for which the 
OECD assigns a ﬁscal multiplier greater than 1. 
Canada’s MDMB is 0.73, meaning that 
Canadians must receive at least 73 cents in beneﬁts 
from an additional dollar spent on a ﬁscal stimu-
lus measure, such as a home renovation tax credit, 
that generates a direct consumption beneﬁt for it 
to be justiﬁed on a beneﬁt-cost basis. The MDMB 
for the United States, 0.53, is lower than Canada’s 
because the United States has a lower MCF and 
a higher ﬁscal multiplier. For both countries, 
however, the MDMB is less than 1, indicating that 
projects that would not normally be funded would 
qualify as ﬁscal stimulus measures. These results 
for Canada and the United States probably offer 
more comfort to proponents of discretionary ﬁscal 
policies than to skeptics.
Figure 4 also shows the MMP for ﬁscal stimu-
lus measures that enhance labour productivity. 
Notice that, for all countries except Poland, the 
MMP is less than the corresponding MDMB. 
This means that an infrastructure project has a 
lower threshold than a pure public service project 
because a productivity-enhancing project gener-
ates additional tax revenues in the future, reduc-
ing the future tax increase required to pay for the 
public-sector borrowing that is used to ﬁnance it. 
For Canada, the MMP is 0.61, meaning that an 
infrastructure project, such as a highway improve-
ment, must increase labour productivity by at least 
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Figure 4:   Minimum Direct Marginal Beneﬁt (MDMB) and Minimum Marginal Product 
(MMP) from Fiscal Stimulus, 20 OECD Countries
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to be justiﬁed on a beneﬁt-cost basis. Presumably, 
many infrastructure projects could satisfy this 
condition, but it is difﬁcult to get them “off the 
shelf” fast enough to provide the ﬁscal stimulus 
when it is needed. Leigh and Stehn (2009, table 
1) highlight the problem of delays in using capital 
projects as ﬁscal stimulus measures.
Can spending on useless projects ever be justi-
ﬁed? If the MCF is 1.50, its average value for the 
sample of 20 OECD countries, and if the tax rate 
is 0.33, which is close to the overall OECD aver-
age, then the MDMB is zero if the multiplier is 
1.29. Thus, for many OECD countries, the ﬁscal 
multiplier would have to be greater than 1.29 to 
justify Keynes’s belief that useless projects could be 
used to stimulate the economy “if there are politi-
cal and practical difﬁculties” in funding sensible 
projects. 
Determinants of the Fiscal Policy 
Responses of OECD Countries
In an article in the Financial Times, Paul De 
Grauwe (2009) claims that disputes among 
prominent economists about the effectiveness of 
ﬁscal stimulus have affected policy responses:
    With so much disagreement it is no surprise 
that policymakers are unsure and vacillate. 
Some countries, such as the US and France, 
go all out for the Keynesian story; others, such 
as Germany, put more faith in the Ricardians. 
Personally I think the Keynesians are right, 
but my opinion is irrelevant. The point is that 
the cacophony of analysis helps to explain why 
policymakers react in different ways to the 
same crisis and why it is so difﬁcult for them to 
come up with co-ordinated action.
While there are clear differences among leading 
economists about the size of ﬁscal multipliers 
and the harm caused by increases in the public 
debt to ﬁnance ﬁscal stimulus, policymakers 
in different countries may have made different 
choices because they face different circumstances. 
In this view, it is not so much the differences in 
the views of economists, but differences in the 
economic and ﬁscal situations of these countries, 
that account for the variety of policy responses. 
Can the ﬁscal stimulus measures adopted by the 
20 OECD countries in the sample in fact be 
explained by differences in their economic and 
ﬁscal circumstances?
The model outlined in the previous section 
suggests that the degree of ﬁscal stimulus should 
be larger in countries that have a lower MDMB 
and MMP. Regression analysis indicates, however, 
that these two measures are not closely related to 
the degree of ﬁscal stimulus the 20 OECD coun-
tries have adopted. The model, it turns out, lacks 
two factors that might have inﬂuenced policymak-
ers’ responses: the size of the shock to their econ-
omy and the strength of their economy’s auto-
matic stabilizers. Indeed, the latter factor has often 
been used to explain the difference in the policy 
responses of the United States and members of the 
European Union.
Appendix B outlines a model that predicts that 
the ﬁscal stimulus a country adopts should increase 
as the severity of the economic shock and the 
product of its tax rate and the MCF increase, and 
should be lower the larger are the economy’s auto-
matic stabilizers. The size of the multiplier could 
either raise or lower the optimal ﬁscal stimulus. 
Horton and Ivanova (2009) attribute the variation 
in the ﬁscal policy responses among G20 countries 
to differences in their automatic stabilizers, output 
gaps, ﬁscal multipliers, and their ﬁscal circum-
stances, as reﬂected in their level of public debt, 
contingent liabilities, and interest rates.
To test the predictions of the model, one needs 
values for the automatic stabilizer, the increase in 
the government deﬁcit when the economy’s total 
output declines by one percentage point, and the 
size of the shock that each OECD country received 
during the current recession. As Figure 5 shows, 
not surprisingly, countries with large social welfare 
programs – Denmark, France, the Netherlands, 
and Sweden – have the largest automatic stabiliz-
ers, while Canada, Japan, Switzerland, and the 
United States, with relatively lower tax rates and 
less comprehensive social welfare programs, have 
the smallest automatic stabilizers.| 8  Backgrounder 121
C.D. Howe Institute   
Another key variable is the size of the output 
gap, which measures the difference between an 
economy’s output with full employment and its 
actual output.  Since the output gap reﬂects the 
impact of each country’s ﬁscal stimulus and its 
automatic stabilizers, is not a direct measure of 
the size of the economic shock. Figure 6 shows 
the OECD’s estimates of the output gaps in the 
20 countries in the sample in ﬁscal year 2009 
and 2010. Given the OECD’s estimates of ﬁscal 
stimulus measures, automatic stabilizers, and ﬁscal 
multipliers, however, one can “back out” the size 
of the shock for each economy (see Figure 7). Note 
that, although Sweden is predicted to have the 
largest output gap in 2009/10, Australia appears 
to have received the largest shock to its economy, 
while Switzerland received the smallest shock even 




Fiscal Stimulus FIG 3 Fiscal Multiplier FIG 5 AutoStab
















































































































































Figure 5: Automatic Stabilizers, 20 OECD Countries
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Figure 6: Average Output Gap as Percentage of GDP , 20 OECD Countries, in 2009 and 2010
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8 Although there are differences between each country’s estimated economic shock and its output gap, the correlation coefﬁcient between the 
two series, at 0.59, is high.
reversals in ranking reﬂect the ﬁscal stimulus Australia 
has adopted and the size of Poland’s multiplier.8
A country’s use of ﬁscal stimulus relative to the 
size of the economic shock it has received is shown 
in Figure 8. By this measure, New Zealand and the 
Czech Republic, followed closely by the United 
States, have been the most aggressive in adopt-
ing discretionary ﬁscal policies, with ﬁscal stimulus 
measures that exceed 50 percent of the shock. On 
the other hand, France’s ﬁscal stimulus has been less 
than 10 percent of its shock. These calculations indi-
cate, contrary to De Grauwe’s claim, that France has 
not adopted a very activist Keynesian ﬁscal policy.
Figure 9 shows the actual ﬁscal stimulus and 
predicted ﬁscal stimulus for the 20 OECD coun-
tries (see Appendix B for the regression equation 
containing these variables). The ﬁgure reveals that the 
predictions in the model tend to underestimate the 
level of ﬁscal stimulus adopted by high-ﬁscal-stimulus 
countries such as the United States and Canada, and 
to overestimate the level of ﬁscal stimulus adopted by 
low-ﬁscal-stimulus countries. The prediction errors 
are especially large for Japan, New Zealand, and 
Sweden, perhaps reﬂecting differences in the type of 
shock these countries received. For example, a coun-
try that received a shock to its housing sector might 
have responded in a different way than one that 
received a shock to its export sector. Further analysis 
might reveal the underlying cause of these prediction 
errors. My overall conclusion, however, is that, while 
the differing views of economists might have had 
some inﬂuence on countries’ ﬁscal policy responses, 
differences in these countries’ objective circumstances 
explain a large part of the variation in the ﬁscal stim-
ulus measures they have adopted.
Conclusion
Using estimates of 20 OECD countries’ ﬁscal 
multipliers and their marginal cost of funds from 
public-sector borrowing, I ﬁnd that the minimum 
marginal beneﬁt of ﬁscal stimulus packages 
varies widely both among these countries and 
between projects that provide direct consumption 
beneﬁts, such as renovating a hockey rink, and 
productivity- enhancing projects, such as investing 
in transportation infrastructure. For Canada, a ﬁscal 
stimulus project that improves consumptive public 
services has to provide at least 73 cents in beneﬁts 
for each dollar of ﬁscal stimulus to be justiﬁable on 
a beneﬁt-cost basis. For a productivity-enhancing 
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Figure 7:   Estimated Economic Shock as Percentage of GDP , 20 OECD Countries,  
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increase in labour productivity must be at least 61 
cents for each dollar spent on infrastructure to pass 
the beneﬁt-cost test.
These results suggest that projects that would 
not satisfy beneﬁt-cost criteria in “normal times” 
might be justiﬁed as part of a ﬁscal stimulus pack-
age in “abnormal times” when there is substantial 
involuntary unemployment. However, except 
for Poland, “useless projects” – such as Keynes’s 
famous example of burying bottles full of money 
in abandoned mines – cannot be justiﬁed simply 
because they provide ﬁscal stimulus. 
Differences in the economic and ﬁscal circum-
stances of OECD countries – the nature of the 
shock to their economy, the size of their econo-
my’s automatic stabilizers, the magnitude of their 
ﬁscal multiplier, the level of taxation, and their 
marginal cost of funds borrowed for public sector 
spending – explain a high proportion of the varia-
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Figure 8:   The Ratio of Fiscal Stimulus Measures to the Size of the Economic Shock  
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9 This is a variant of the Atkinson-Stern condition for the optimal provision of a public good. In general, MBG and MCF would also reﬂect the 
distributional effects of the public service and the taxes that are used to ﬁnance it, but that issue is ignored in the current application.
10 See Dahlby (2006, 2008) on the theory and measurement of the MCF for public-sector borrowing.
The cost of a project takes two forms: the value of the resources the project uses and the harm caused 
by tax rate increases required to ﬁnance the project. Consequently, spending an additional dollar on a 
project is worthwhile if the present discount value of the marginal beneﬁt of the project, MBG, satisﬁes the 
following condition:9
           (A.1)
where MCF is the marginal cost to society of raising an additional dollar to ﬁnance the project and RG 
is the additional tax revenue that is generated as a result of spending an additional dollar on the project. 
MCF is often greater than 1 because tax increases distort the allocation of resources in the economy. 
The expression in round brackets is the net amount to be ﬁnanced, which may be less than a dollar if, 
for example, the project enhances productivity and therefore helps to generate additional tax revenues at 
existing tax rates. If the project is ﬁnanced by debt, instead of current tax revenues, the MCF concept is 
still applicable and can be interpreted as the cost imposed on society in raising the additional tax revenue 
to ﬁnance interest payments on the debt.10
The above condition is very general, however, so I adopt notation that is more applicable to the evalu-
ation of ﬁscal stimulus. Consider two types of ﬁscal stimulus: projects that provide a direct consumption 
beneﬁt, such as repairing a hockey arena or a tax credit for home renovations, and projects that make the 
private sector more productive, such as investing in transportation infrastructure. For the former, the last 
dollar spent on a ﬁscal stimulus package ﬁnanced by an increase in public debt will generate a net social 
gain if the following variant of the above condition holds:
(A.2)
where m is the ﬁscal policy multiplier, DMB is the direct marginal beneﬁt from a dollar spent on ﬁscal 
stimulus, and τ is the tax rate. I assume that the economy has unemployed resources and, therefore, the 
additional dollar of government spending (or tax cut) generates additional after-tax income equal to  
(1 – τ)m. On the right-hand side, I substitute mτ for RG in equation (A.1) to make explicit the idea that 
the additional income generated by the project through the multiplier effect also increases tax revenues. In 
evaluating a ﬁscal stimulus program, MCF reﬂects the cost to society of ﬁnancing an additional dollar of 
public-sector debt. 
Every ﬁscal stimulus package is made up of a variety of measures, and the direct marginal beneﬁts of 
these measures may vary widely and are not usually reported in any of the background documentation 
provided by government. Consequently, I calculate the minimum direct marginal beneﬁt (MDMB) 
required for a ﬁscal stimulus measure to satisfy the beneﬁt-cost condition. The MDMB is deﬁned by the 
following equation:
           (A.3)
MDMB is a threshold direct marginal beneﬁt that projects must meet or exceed. When MDMB is higher, 
fewer projects will satisfy the beneﬁt-cost criterion and a country should adopt a lower level of ﬁscal 
stimulus. A larger MCF will raise MDMB (assuming m   is less than 1) and MDMB will be lower when 
the multiplier is higher.
A Simple Beneﬁt-cost Framework for Evaluating Fiscal Stimulus Appendix A
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How high does the multiplier have to be to justify spending on a “useless” project? If one sets MDMB 
equal to zero in equation (A.3), the multiplier must be larger than MCF/(1 + τ(MCF – 1)) to justify 
spending on a useless project. For Canada, with MCF = 1.30 and τ = 0.43, this implies that spending on 
a useless project could be justiﬁed if the multiplier is greater than 1.15. This is considerably higher than 
the OECD’s estimate of the multiplier for Canada, 0.50.
Infrastructure projects that boost labour productivity are evaluated in a slightly different manner. 
Suppose an investment in public infrastructure is ﬁnanced by a tax on labour income at the rate τ, and it 
increases labour productivity and workers’ wage rates by wG. The direct net beneﬁt of the infrastructure 
project is (1 – τ)LwG, where L is the total amount of labour employed. In a full-employment economy, the 
additional tax revenue generated by an additional dollar spent on the project is τ(1 + η)LwG, where η   is 
the elasticity of labour supply. The MCF from taxing labour is 1/(1 – τη /(1 – τ)). In a full economy, the 
optimal level of spending on public infrastructure is determined by the condition FG ≡ LwG = 1.11 The 
additional revenue that the public infrastructure generates by increasing labour incomes just offsets the 
disincentive effect for labour supply from raising the tax rate on labour income, and infrastructure should 
be provided up to the point where an additional dollar spent on infrastructure increases the present value 
of labour income by one dollar. With unemployed labour, the optimality condition would be modiﬁed to 
reﬂect the additional net income generated through the multiplier effect, and would be equal to:
(A.4)
Solving for FG, one obtains:
          (A.5)
The right-hand side of the equation represents the required minimum net present value of the increase 
in labour income from a productivity-enhancing infrastructure project, MMP. In the computations of 
MMP in Figure 4, I use 0.15 for the aggregate labour supply elasticity for all countries. The computations 
indicate that the minimum marginal product of an infrastructure project is generally lower than the 
minimum direct marginal beneﬁt from a project that provides direct consumption beneﬁts. (The one 
exception is Poland, where the multiplier exceeds 1.)
Finally, a cautionary note needs to be mentioned about the framework used in deriving these beneﬁt-
cost results. In adding the after-tax income generated by the multiplier effects to the beneﬁt side of the 
equation and taking into account the additional tax revenues that this increase in income generates, I 
use a simple Keynesian framework based on short-run responses to ﬁscal stimulus in an economy with 
involuntarily unemployed resources. The cost of ﬁscal stimulus, the MCF from public-sector borrowing, 
is computed using a long-run growth model in which it is assumed that the economy is always at full 
employment and the debt-to-GDP ratio is stable. Thus, the empirical measures of beneﬁts and costs are 
derived from two very different frameworks, and I do not take into account the transition from the short 
run to the long run. This inconsistency reﬂects the gap in the economics profession’s set of tools, but one 
hopes that the recent recession and the revival of ﬁscal stimulus as a tool for macroeconomic stabilization 
will spur research efforts to close the gap and integrate short-run neo-Keynesian models with long-run 
growth models.
11 This is a special case of the Atkinson-Stern condition for the optimal provision of a public good.
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In this appendix, I incorporate the automatic stabilizer and the size of the ﬁscal shock in a simple model of 
the optimal ﬁscal stimulus and then estimate the model to see if it is consistent with the variation in ﬁscal 
responses by OECD countries. Appendix Tables B-1 and B-2 provide sources and descriptions of key 
variables and Descriptive Statistics used in the model.
Predicting Fiscal Stimulus Measures Adapted by OECD Couintries Appendix B
Variable Symbol Source Notes
Automatic stabilizer � Girouard and André 
(2005, table 9)
Estimate of the change of 
the budget balance, as a % 
of GDP, for a 1% change in 
GDP.
Fiscal multiplier m OECD (2009, ﬁg. 3.4.B) Figures for Italy, Mexico, and 
Norway not provided.
Fiscal stimulus FS OECD (2009, table 3.1) Figures for Greece and 
Turkey not provided; Hungry, 
Iceland, and Ireland had 
contractionary ﬁscal policies 
and were excluded from the 
sample of countries.
Marginal cost of public 
funds
MCF Author’s calculations based 
on Dahlby (2006, 2008)
Examples of computations 
are available from the author 
upon request.
Output gap �Y OECD Economic 
Outlook 85 database.
Average ﬁscal gap in ﬁscal 
year 2009/10; ﬁgures for 
South Korea and Slovakia not 
provided.
Shock �S Author’s calculations based 
on equation (5).
Tax rate � OECD Economic 
Outlook 84 database, 
annex table 26.
Average general government 
total tax and nontax receipts, 
1996–2006.
Table B1: Sources and Descriptions of Key Variables
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
FS 2.585 1.507 0.50 5.60
MCF 1.512 0.479 1.096 3.175
m 0.449 0.238 0.13 1.21
� 0.436 0.0736 0.32 0.58
� 0.451 0.0741 0.33 0.59
�Y 5.573 1.387 2.20 8.20
�S 8.411 2.026 4.65 12.63
Table B2: Descriptive Statistics| 14  Backgrounder 121
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I begin by incorporating the idea that the additional income generated through the multiplier effect 
is more valuable the larger is the decline in output during a recession. In other words, ﬁscal stimulus is 
more “valuable” if people will suffer a larger income shock. Second, I assume that the direct marginal 
beneﬁt from ﬁscal stimulus measures declines with the amount of ﬁscal stimulus. In other words, the 
quality of the marginal project declines when more projects are funded as part of a stimulus package. In 
particular, I assume that DMB = v –   FS, where v and   are positive constants and FS is the magnitude of 
the ﬁscal stimulus package, measured as a percentage of GDP. With these two modiﬁcations, the condi-
tion for the optimal ﬁscal stimulus becomes
(B.1)
where   Y is the reduction in income caused by the shock to the economy and    is a positive constant. 
The reduction in income (or the output gap) will depend on the size of the shock to the economy,   S, the 
size of its automatic stabilizers, and the level of ﬁscal stimulus that the country adopts. This is formalized as
(B.2)
where a is the increase in the ﬁscal deﬁcit because of increased social assistance and unemployment 
beneﬁts and/or reductions in tax revenues because of the shock. The parameter a is a measure of the 
economy’s automatic stabilizers. I also assume that, under “normal conditions,” when the economy does 
not need ﬁscal stimulus, the marginal project satisﬁes the condition v = MCF. Using this condition and 
substituting equation (B.2) into (B.1), we obtain the following equation for the optimal ﬁscal stimulus:
(B.3)
This model indicates that the optimal ﬁscal stimulus should increase with the product of the tax rate 
and MCF, decrease with the size of its automatic stabilizer, and increase with the size of the shock to the 
economy if am < 1. It also indicates that the size of the multiplier has an ambiguous effect on the size of the 
optimal ﬁscal stimulus.12 Equation (B.3) indicates that there should be no ﬁscal stimulus if the economy 
is at full employment and the ﬁscal multiplier is zero, because additional government spending simply 
displaces private spending. During a recession, when there are unemployed resources in the economy and 
the ﬁscal multiplier is positive, the optimal ﬁscal stimulus depends on the magnitude of the multiplier, but 
direction of the effect could be positive or negative. That the optimal ﬁscal stimulus could be lower when 
the multiplier is larger might seem surprising, but it could arise if the automatic stabilizers are relatively 
large and, therefore, there is less need for ﬁscal stimulus. Also, the prediction that optimal ﬁscal stimulus 
will be larger when the product of the tax rate and MCF is higher might seem counterintuitive, but note 
that  �MCF measures the gain from the induced increase in tax revenues from the ﬁscal stimulus. Finally, 
note that �am is less than 1 for all countries (including Poland, where the multiplier is greater than 1) and, 
therefore, the optimal ﬁscal stimulus should increase with the size of the shock. 
 The magnitude of the economic shock to each country can be inferred from the OECD’s estimates 
for each of the output gap, ∆Y, and the level of ﬁscal stimulus, FS, by solving equation (B.2) for ∆S, or
(B.4)
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12   Evaluated at m = 0; that is, when the economy is at full employment, the derivative of FS with respect to m is positive and decreasing in a.
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As noted above, the optimal ﬁscal stimulus a country adopts should increase in � MCF and �∆ S and 
decrease in a, and the size of the multiplier could either raise or lower the optimal ﬁscal stimulus. This 
model can be tested based on OECD data and parameters and my calculations of each country’s MCF, 
although, with only 20 observations, one’s ability to test these predictions is rather limited. Because the 
optimal ﬁscal stimulus is highly nonlinear in these variables, I specify the regression equation in log linear 
form, with the following results (the t-statistics are shown in parentheses):
The statistical results are consistent with the predictions of the optimal ﬁscal stimulus model. The ﬁscal 
stimulus is high in countries that have received larger shocks and lower in countries with higher automatic 
stabilizers. The product of the tax rate and MCF has a positive effect on FS, as predicted, but the effect is 
not statistically signiﬁcant at the 95 percent conﬁdence level. Finally, the regression results indicate that 
the ﬁscal stimulus is lower in countries with higher ﬁscal multipliers, a result that is consistent with the 
predictions of the model if automatic stabilizers are relatively large.
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